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When Congress enacted federal deposit insurance in 1933, scholars understood it
to be a tool for helping small banks and for restoring the liquidity of bank deposits.  Still,
Calomiris and White (1994, p. 164) note that by late 1931, representatives of urban
constituencies in “eastern states that had not supported deposit insurance for decades
introduced federal deposit insurance bills.”  These authors argue that the severity of losses
experienced in the early 1930s caused this switch, energizing small depositors into a
political force strong enough to overcome unvarying large-bank opposition to deposit
insurance.  In their view, “small, rural banks and lower-income individuals (with small
deposit accounts) were clear winners, while large, big-city banks, wealthy depositors and
depositors in failed banks were losers.”
It was of course recognized at the outset that deposit insurance could also have
incentive effects.  In particular, Emerson (1934) explained that deposit insurance would
intensify risk-taking incentives at banks unless it was properly priced and principles of
sound banking were consistently enforced. In the late 1960s, scholars began to argue that
deposit insurance was mispriced (Scott and Mayer, 1971) and had in fact fueled a massive
reduction in stockholder-contributed bank capital (Pelzman, 1970).  But it was not until
the onset of the 1989 FSLIC debacle that the profession came to appreciate the many and
perverse ways that this substitution of subsidized government guarantees for stockholder-
contributed capital at insured institutions shifted risks from owners to taxpayers.
This paper shows that the rebalancing of Congressional support in the 1930s may
have been assisted by changes in the funding-cost benefits that deposit insurance could
offer stockholders in a substantial number of large urban banks.  The analysis uses theories
of regulatory competition and financial contracting under information asymmetry to2
explain these benefits and to challenge the Calomiris-White characterization of the initial
beneficiaries of federal deposit insurance.
Evidence of stockholder benefits at large banks was first developed in Wilson and
Kane (1997).  Wilson and Kane show that at large national banks the longstanding
contracting protocol in which stockholders attached contingent personal guarantees to
bank debt began to unravel in the late 1920s.  This protocol dictated wind-up rules for
insolvent banks that --at national banks and at banks chartered by all but ten states--
extended the liability of shareholders for bank debt beyond the value of the assets owned
by the firm.
The predominant wind-up rule divided stockholder-contributed capital into
separate par and surplus accounts.  Par capital (sometimes called “legal capital”) is the
minimum amount of capital (PAR) that the jurisdiction chartering a bank dictates that the
stockholders maintain as on-balance-sheet equity.  Surplus capital (SUR) is the sum of
additional paid-in capital and undistributed profits that have not been allocated to the par
account.  Stockholder in national banks and in state-chartered banks in most extended-
liability states were subject to “double liability” on the par value of their stock.  Double
liability means that, to cover a liquidating bank’s unpaid debts, the receiver could
personally assess each stockholder for an amount up to its pro rata share of the bank’s par
capital.  For stock held in a “street name,” the nominee would be assessed and incur the
cost of collecting the reimbursement it was due from the ultimate owner.
Winton (1993) analyzes the agency costs that extended-liability shareholders and
corporate creditors face when there is asymmetric information about shareholders’ wealth.
His model clarifies that contingent liability would affect investor incentives to own and
trade bank stock and would influence stockholders’ incentive to monitor bank managers.
These incentives vary over time with five factors:  the condition of the bank , the level of
shareholder wealth, the shareholder’s proportionate position in the bank, the probity of
controlling interests, and the degree of asymmetry in information about shareholder
wealth. In turn, the value of stock shares in a double-liability bank should rise and fall with
the strength of monitoring incentives.3
Winton’s model implies that, if we could observe agency costs, variation in these
costs would prove more important at large banks than at small ones.  First, other things
equal, a large bank’s asset base may be expected to be more complex and therefore harder
for outsiders to value.  Second, other things equal, a large bank may be expected to have a
more diffuse stockholder list than a smaller bank.  At small banks during the days of
double liability, loan business tended to be local, ownership tended to be highly
concentrated, and bank stock could not be traded anonymously.
Winton’s analysis supports the hypothesis that, as the stockholder distribution and
geographic reach of large U.S. banks broadened during the stock-market bubble of the
1920s, double liability might have ceased to be an efficient way to control incentive
conflict among large-bank stakeholders.  A web of empirical evidence is woven in this
paper that buttresses this inference.
Standard explanations of the banking crisis of the 1930s focus on pressure
generated by customer deposit runs.  As a byproduct, this paper serves to rationalize
customer runs at large banks by portraying them in part as a response to a prior silent run
by large-block shareholders from bank stock.
Winton’s model lets one interpret the banking crisis of the 1930s as evidencing a
loss of customer confidence in the value of the services stockholders performed in
monitoring managerial performance and solvency at large banks.  This interpretation in no
way challenges Friedman and Schwartz’ (1963) conclusion that the Federal Reserve ought
to have used its discount window more aggressively or the idea that deposit insurance
enhanced bank liquidity.  Our contracting-theory perspective similarly complements
Gorton’s (1988) argument that timid Federal Reserve lending could not substitute
effectively for the triage activities performed by private bank clearinghouses during the
1863-1914 National Banking era.  Besides adding liquidity to the economy, aggressive
Federal Reserve lending would have imposed extensive monitoring and triage duties on
Fed officials in order to exercise the due diligence implicit in any responsible lending
decision.
The contracting-theory perspective also clarifies that the discount window and
federal deposit-insurance guarantees are not redundant policy instruments.  The discount4
window serves to guarantee the liquidity of deposits only at economically solvent banks.
Deposit insurance serves to bond the contractual performance even of the rest of the
banking system.  It does this by imposing a credible and nonlinear penalty structure on the
government for failures in monitoring bank safety and soundness (Black, Miller and
Posner, 1978).
I.  Contracting Perspectives on the Nature of Banking
Recent banking research has injected asymmetric-information contracting-theory
perspectives into theories of managing repeat-business customer relationships (Hodgman,
1963; Kane and Malkiel, 1965), delegated monitoring (Diamond, 1984), and deposit
insurance (Merton and Bodie, 1994; Kane, 1995).  The result has been to fashion an
asymmetric-information contracting theory of banking and banking policy.
The guiding principle of principal-agent contracting theory is that banks and
regulators are drawn to contracts that give all counterparties an incentive to use scarce
information and resources efficiently (Jensen and Meckling, 1975).  An important
application of the theory is to explain how over time and space the character of the
contracting protocols used by banks and other financial institutions adapt to variation in
informational transparency, managerial and financial technology, and regulation.  The
penetration of contracting perspectives into banking theory helps to explain why and how
risk-based regulatory restraints on capital structure have come to displace liquidity
requirements as the central policy tools for controlling bank risk.
Traditional banking theory saw a bank simply as a financial intermediary (Gurley
and Shaw, 1960).  Contracting theory portrays bank activities far more generally.  A bank
becomes an ever-adapting exercise in financial engineering: an amorphous information and
deal-making factory.
In their back offices, banking factories collect information, verify information,
store information, process information, manage information, and transmit information for
their own and customer accounts over various internal and external communications
networks.  Middle-office personnel use the warehoused information to design and price a5
series of incentive-compatible contracting protocols.  Each protocol records the fact that
the bank and customer agree on the explicit terms of a financial deal and assigns specific
and enforceable rights and duties to the counterparties.  Finally, front-office personnel
negotiate deals and exchange contracts and services with customers.
Corporate-finance theory emphasizes that every contract establishes a principal-
agent relationship between the counterparties.  Agency costs are costs that arise whenever
a contractual agent does not fully share the objectives of its principal.  Agency costs have
three components:
1.  costs that agent incurs to bond its willingness to perform its duties under the
contract;
2.  costs that the principal incurs to monitor and enforce contractual performance;
3.  residual opportunities for nonperformance that are not controlled by the
contract.
The central proposition in agency theory is that counterparties have an incentive to
minimize agency costs.  These costs are minimized when the marginal costs of the
bonding, monitoring, and enforcement controls put in place equal the marginal benefit of
the residual nonperformance opportunities that these controls rein in.
In banking activities, principal-agent relationships and resulting agency costs are
thickly layered.  When a bank is acting simply as a financial intermediary, it simultaneously
agrees to act as an agent in deposit contracts and to act as a principal in requiring its
borrowers to repay their loans.  When a bank securitizes a pool of loans which it continues
to service, it enters into a three-way contract.  It becomes an agent both for the investors
in the pool and for the borrowers whose payments it collects.  Similarly, when a bank
enhances the credit of a bond issuer, it incurs an agency obligation to the bondholders and
becomes a principal to the issuer.
Capital contributed by stockholders bonds a wider range of a bank’s agency
obligations than is expressly covered by federal deposit-insurance guarantees.  But
conjectural implicit federal guarantees pass through an indirect blessing to most of an
insured bank’s other contractual obligations.  The value of an institution’s conjectural
guarantees grows with its regional or national economic importance and with its political6
clout.  This is because authorities have strong incentives to go slow in disciplining or
closing an important bank.  The productivity of a bank’s efforts to sidetrack disciplinary
action allows a bank’s counterparties to count on having time to unwind at low cost their
uninsured positions in a troubled bank.
To reduce the agency costs occasioned by implicit guarantees was a principal
objective of the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991.  This Act imposes specific duties of
prompt corrective action and least-cost insolvency regulation on federal banking
regulators.
II.  Regression Evidence of Long-Lasting Contracting-Theory Disequilibrium in the 1930s
Winton’s model clarifies that extended liability imposes contingent obligations that
bond the obligation of large-block shareholders to monitor bank managers on behalf of
other stakeholders.  The net value of the extended liability bond (E) to stockholders may
be interpreted as the difference between compensation paid for their monitoring and loss-
control services and the costs they incur in performing and bonding these services. The
gross compensation declines whenever creditors perceive stockholder monitoring services
to decline in quality or reliability.  The net compensation also varies with anything that
affects the costs engendered by the contract.
Increases in stockholder distribution make it harder for other stakeholders to
assess the value of contingent stockholder support.  An increase in the breadth of
stockholder distribution makes it more costly for all stakeholders to use a bank’s
stockholder list to monitor the wealth or stock trading of the bank’s owners.  Monitoring
costs are increased because ownership becomes less concentrated and stock trading
becomes more anonymous.  On the other hand, maintaining narrow ownership to enhance
stock-trading transparency and stockholder incentives to monitor managerial activity
imposes costs on bank shareholders and may decrease a bank’s intangible assets by
limiting the bank’s ability to pursue its growth opportunities.
It would be a mistake to assume that market forces require E to equal zero at all
times.  As long as stockholders were legally forced to post the double-liability bond, the
costs to stockholders of supporting the bond could rise above the benefits to depositors.7
On the other hand, the premium paid for monitoring services could exceed stockholder
performance and bonding costs for two reasons.  Large-block shareholders could develop
private information and they could bond their monitoring performance with highly illiquid
assets that they knew wouldn’t have to be liquidated or borrowed against unless the bank
became distressed.  Research by Calomiris and Kahn (1991) shows how the issuance of
demandable debt would reinforce large-block stockholders’ monitoring incentives by
making it easy for depositors to penalize these stockholders nonlinearly as soon as
customers began to lose confidence in the bank or its policies.
Using quarterly data and the statistical market-value accounting model, Wilson and
Kane (1997) have estimated the average net monitoring premium E that stockholders
earned through the contingent-liability bond at double-liability banks during 1927-1933.
Charts 1 and 2 summarize the outcome of their chief regression experiment.  At
each date, the model regresses the value of the bank’s market capitalization against the
reported values of par capital, surplus capital, and lagged market capitalization.  The
underlying intuition is that markets price stock using accounting data and unspecified
other information.  The influence of nonaccounting information is proxied by the lagged
value of the endogenous variable.  Using this model, the t-value of the difference between
the regression coefficients for the predetermined variables PAR and SUR serves to
establish whether E differs significantly from zero.
The data set is cross-classified by size and wind-up rules.  Banks are partitioned
into two size classes, then subdivided into three contracting-theory environments: limited-
liability state banks (LLSB) as a control group, extended-liability state banks (DLSB), and
double-liability national banks (DLNB).  The data are assembled from the William B. Dana
Company’s Bank and Quotation Record.
The authors find that, for all classes, the sign and statistical significance of the net
monitoring premium fluctuated greatly from quarter to quarter.  The Charts display results
for a partition in which the threshold between large and small banks is set at $2 million in
the book value of equity.  However, the qualitative difference in the sign and statistical
significance of E proved robust to substantial increases and decreases in the size threshold.8
The time series of cross-section regression coefficients indicates that double
liability seldom offered statistically significant net benefits or burdens to stockholders of
small banks at any time during 1927-1933.  This implies that depositors felt that they
could readily monitor stockholders and managers of small banks.  Through 1930.2, similar
results emerge even for large state-chartered banks.
But large national banks showed a different pattern.  From 1927.2 through 1929.2,
stockholders at large national banks earned a positive average monitoring premium.
During the next four quarters, the premium declined to insignificance.  Then, from mid-
1930 on, the estimated monitoring premium became predominantly negative at large banks
in all extended-liability jurisdictions.  The frequency and significance of negative values
proved greater for large national banks than for large institutions chartered in extended-
liability states.
Contracting theory suggests that we may interpret these estimates as follows.
During the late 1920s, large-block stockholders at most institutions earned only a normal
return on their bonding services; however, stockholders at large national banks were able
to extract an expected net premium for bonding their monitoring services.  As the
depression and the banking crisis of the 1930s unfolded, the inherited extended-liability
contracting structure became inefficient.  In this period of reduced stockholder
concentration, increased bank transparency, and continuing negative shocks to shareholder
wealth, the benefits of double liability declined sharply at many banks.  The gross
monitoring premium offered could no longer cover the costs to bank stockholders of
maintaining the bond.  These costs consisted of limitations on acceptable sources of capital
that reduced profit growth and constraints on share liquidity.  Both of these costs were
functions of trading restrictions that served to protect creditors and wealthy shareholders
from being victimized by transactions that transferred stock to persons who could not be
expected to cover their share of contingent obligations.
III. Supporting Evidence
This paper subjects the contracting-theory explanation for deposit-insurance
enactment to three sensitivity tests.  The first and second tests are event studies.  These9
tests seek to ascertain whether and how federal banking legislation enacted in 1927 and
1933 affected stock-price appreciation at a sample of New York City banks.  Because
both pieces of legislation contained provisions that promised to impact other channels of
projected bank profitability, our tests partition the samples in ways that could identify a
putative legislative effect on the size of the net double-liability premium.
A major aim of the Banking Act of 1933 was to compartmentalize commercial
banking from investment banking.  Its relevance for the double liability premium is that the
Act established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and initiated a process
of phasing out double liability for national banks.
The major effect of the Banking Act of 1927 was to constrain interstate banking to
the detriment of large banks.  This legislation promised to affect the double liability
premium by removing a longstanding $100 floor on the par value of national-bank stock
shares.  This provision authorized national banks to split their stock to increase share
liquidity and to broaden the distribution of ownership by making shares in the bank more
affordable to smaller investors.
The Dana Company’s Bank and Quotation Record is the principal source of the
data analyzed in Charts 1 and 2.  This source collected dealer bid and asked prices on bank
stock once a month.  The time aggregation entailed in using monthly data undermines our
ability to isolate the effects of specific information flows.  In intervals as rich in economic
surprises and policy proposals as Franklin Roosevelt’s first few months in office, it is
unreasonable to suppose that we can disentangle from monthly movements in bank-stock
prices much information about the benefits of a single piece of legislation.
To confront this difficulty, we focus our event-study tests on weekly data reported
in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle used by Calomiris and Wilson (1996).  This
source gives weekly stock quotes for 51 New York City (NYC) banks.  The sample
includes 9 large and 9 small national banks and 22 large and 11 small banks chartered by
the double-liability state of New York.
A third branch of our analysis directly examines the evolution of shareholder
concentration at NYC banks during 1927-1933.  We begin by confirming that many of the
banks in our 1933 NYC sample previously pursued the opportunity to lower their par10
value by undertaking a stock split.  We next analyze, in event time, the price behavior
these stocks show before and after they split.  We show that each bank’s event-week
response in 1933 correlates positively with the percentage change in its stockholder
distribution.  We also use an ad hoc regression model to test hypotheses about potential
determinants of the breadth of stockholder distribution in the NYC bank sample.
Controlling for four other influences (charter status, surplus capital, the number of
shares outstanding, and a positive time trend), our regression estimates show that the
number of shareholders increased substantially with the par capital of a bank.  This finding
indicates that ownership concentration and the reliability of stockholder monitoring
services declined most sharply at the particular banks whose shareholders faced the largest
aggregate contingent liability.  The greater increase in stockholder distribution at large
banks is consistent with the hypothesis of a “silent run” by informed large-block
stockholders.  Far from using their place in the governance process to discipline bank
managers on behalf of other stakeholders, informed bank stockholders took advantage of
the increased liquidity and anonymity of trading in their lower-priced stock shares to
reduce their personal exposure to what they may have projected to be liquidation losses.
A.  Event-Study Analysis of the Impact of the Banking Act of 1933
We begin by conducting event-study tests of the effects that the enactment of the
Banking Act of 1933 had on the stocks of different classes of national and state banks.
These tests --which use weekly data for New York City Banks-- produce results
consistent with the hypothesis that stockholders of large national banks benefited more
from the passage of the Act than shareholders of either small national banks or institutions
chartered by New York State.  It is not unreasonable to interpret this pattern of benefits as
giving evidence about the value of jettisoning double liability for large-bank stockholders.
This is because rational investors should expect that the capitalized value of benefits
conveyed by the Act’s prohibition on explicit interest on interbank and corporate demand-
deposit balances at large banks to be short-lived (i.e., eaten away over time by competitive
pressure to provide implicit interest) and more than offset by the capitalized value of
opportunity losses rooted in the restrictions that the Act placed on the investment-banking
activities these banks could undertake.11
Table I reports event-study experiments using bank stock-price data covering the
51 weeks that the stock exchanges were open in 1933.  Although the evidential value of
the experiment reported in Panel A is reduced by a low R
2, the result supports the
hypothesis that the elimination of double liability benefited stockholders in large national
banks and in double-liability state banks.  The model fitted in this panel introduces cross-
sectional and event-time dummies into the standard two-parameter market model:
Rit = a + bRMt + uit
R. (1)
In this model, a and b represent the market-model intercept and slope, respectively.  Other
symbols are defined as follows:
Rit:  the percentage price appreciation observed in time interval t for the average of
the bid and asked prices quoted for bank i’s stock;
RMt:  the percentage price appreciation recorded in time interval t for the Dow
Jones industrial average;
uit
R:  the residual return on bank i’s stock in time interval t.
Inference focuses on the significance of coefficients cjk found for the product of
particular bank-classification dummy variables (Djk) and a zero-one event-time dummy
(DT).  The bank-classification dummies are zero except that they become unity when a
bank’s “size index” is j and its “charter index” is k.  Index j is either L (large) or S (small).
The charter index k takes on either the value N (for national banks) or DL (for banks
chartered by the double-liability state of to New York.  The event-time dummy DT is zero
except that it assumes the value of unity for observations occurring in the week that
includes June 12, 1933 --the date on which Franklin Roosevelt signed the Banking Act
into law.
Coefficient estimates support our contention that the Act benefited large national
banks more than other banks.  The coefficients of DLN￿Dw and DLS￿Dw --cLNw and cLSw-- are
positive and significant.  This supports the lobbying-pressure hypothesis that such banking
reform legislation could not pass unless it offered sufficient benefits to win the support of
large banks.  Also, cLNw is greater than cLSw, and both values are well above the
coefficients for smaller banks.  The smaller coefficients for small banks have mixed signs
and do not differ significantly from zero.12
We interpret cLSw as benchmarking the value conferred on large double-liability
banks by federal deposit insurance and deposit-rate restrictions minus the value of
investment-banking opportunities surrendered (see Kroszner and Rajan, 1997) plus the
value to state-chartered large banks of whatever pressure the Act generated on authorities
in New York State to jettison double liability.  Assuming that the capitalized value of
deposit-rate restrictions did not exceed the value of lost opportunities for investment-
banking, the difference (cLNw - cLSw) represents a conservative estimate of the incremental
value stockholders of large national banks received from enacting an end to double
liability.  The standard error of this difference is 4.83 percent, which implies a t-value of
1.65.
Panel B reports coefficients found for the event-week dummy at individual banks
when a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) representation of equation (1) is fitted to
individual banks.  To allow error-covariance estimation to occur without deleting the
weeks that any bank has missing data, it seemed appropriate to restrict the SUR run to
banks that reported stock prices for all 51 trading weeks.  Software limitations dictated
our fitting the SUR model separately for large banks and small banks.  Estimates of event-
week responses differ greatly between the two size classes.  In the large-bank subsample,
only one institution failed to show a positive event-week response.  More than half of
these positive responses were statistically significant at large banks.  On the other hand,
only two small banks showed a substantial event-week effect and no small bank showed a
statistically significant effect at all.
B.  Event-Study Analysis of the Impact of the Banking Act of 1927
A 1924 report of the House banking committee (U.S. Congress, 1924) described
the legislative push behind the bill that evolved into the 1927 Act.  The goal was to “put
new life into the national banking system (p. 4)” by responding to regulatory competition
from state banking legislatures:
... legislation is urgently needed at this time ... to permit national banks
effectively to carry on the banking business and ... to protect them in so far
as Congress can from the inroads of competition from State member banks
of the Federal Reserve System which are operating under charter powers
granted by the State legislatures (p. 1).13
Table II investigates the hypothesis that the Banking Act of 1927 significantly
changed the return-generating process for both national and state banks in our NYC
sample.  In 1927, more individual NYC banks existed than in 1933.  Our experiments
introduce time-varying coefficients into the two-parameter market model (1).  We divide
the 51 observable weeks of 1927 into three segments: the pre-event weeks, t=1, ..., 12; the
event week in which the McFadden Act was passed, t=13; and the post-event weeks,
t=14, ..., 51.  We define the following dummy variables:
D(-)= unity for t=1, ..., 12 and is zero otherwise;
D(0)= unity in the event week 13 and is zero otherwise;
D(+)= unity for t=14, ..., 51 and is zero otherwise.




Coefficient estimates for a(-)and a(+) and b(-) and b(+) indicate that the market-model
parameters increased following the passage of the McFadden Act.  However, only the shift
in a is statistically significant.  The deflection of returns in the event week itself proves
insignificant.  The c coefficients measure the average event-week effects experienced by
banks in different size-charter classes.  Event-week benefits prove positive for small state
banks, while benefits are negative for the other three combinations of charter and size.
However, the t-values for size-charter effects are insignificant and so are coefficient
differences across these classes.
Although the R
2 is low, the significant increase in the market-model intercept
implies that the Banking Act of 1927 supported an increase in expected weekly returns on
bank stock.  The increase in market-model slope, though insignificant, intimates that the
Act may have increased the sensitivity of bank stock to market movements.  As long as
the stock market promised to expand, increased sensitivity would be beneficial for bank
stockholders.
Tests using the SUR model found a significant event-week response (positive) for
only one of 20 large national banks: Garfield National Bank.  SUR runs for 31 large state
banks showed no significant responses and a preponderance of negative values.14
Because the Banking Act of 1927 contains many provisions, these event-study
results cannot be directly nor predominantly attributed to the value of national banks’
newfound freedom to split their stock shares.  It is, however, possible to test three
imbedded hypotheses.  If the freedom was valuable, we would expect inside shareholders
in national banks valuable to use this freedom.  The other hypotheses are that splitting a
bank’s stock would widen a stock’s distribution and importantly affect the post-event
trajectory of a split stock’s price.  We test these hypotheses in the next section.
C.  Analysis of Post-1927 Stock Splits at NYC Banks
Table III shows that 28 of the 51 members of the 1933 NYC sample went on to
split their stock.  All but four of the splits occurred in 1929.  Only three splits occurred
after the October 1929 stock-market crash.  The Times Square Bank is the only split that
occurs during the 1930s.  This 1930 split is also the only case where the quoted or market
stock price does not lie well above the pre-split par value.
Some banks allowed their stockholders to trade at both the old and the new par
values during a transition period.  Table IV uses one such case to clarify that dealer
spreads on the two classes of stocks were not equivalent.  Spreads prove proportionately
much wider on the lower-par class.  The considerable widening of spreads on split shares
is a consistent and intriguing phenomenon in the 1933 NYC sample.  We intend to
investigate this phenomenon in another paper.  We believe that it reflects dealer concern
that insiders might have been selling on adverse information.
The price range in which a stock trades is believed to influence the mix of investors
holding the stock.  in particular, lowering the range is expected to make it easier for low-
wealth investors to trade round lots, increasing: (1) trading liquidity, (2) the number of
stockholders overall (Lamoreux and Poon, 1987) and (3) the ratio of household to
institutional investors (McNichols and Dravid, 1990).
Although subject to survival bias, our data can test the hypothesis of increased
distribution directly.  We presume that increased distribution lowers the size of large-block
holdings and the wealth of the average shareholder.  On this presumption, affirming this
increased-distribution hypothesis adds to the case for inferring a breakdown of the double-
liability contracting protocol at large banks. Signaling theorists (Grinblatt, Masulis, and15
Titman, 1984) hypothesize that splits convey a positive signal about insiders’ private
information in which the size of the split ratio conveys favorable information about future
earnings.  Our data prove inconsistent with this view.
Chart 3A plots the cumulative average appreciation in bid and asked prices during
an event-time window that starts 30 weeks before, and ends 30 weeks after the NYC-
sample stock splits.  To control for market movements, Chart 3B uses each bank’s 61-
week market-model beta to calculate a beta-adjusted cumulative deviation from the price
appreciation recorded for the Dow-Jones Average during each week of the event window.
Chart 3C cumulates the appreciation relative to the Dow-Jones Average itself.  All three
charts show a marked decline in stock performance after a split.
Insiders were selling to dealers at the bid and outsiders were buying at the asked.
This pattern of results indicates selling pressure.  On average, the inside information that
motivated the 1928-30 NYC bank splits was negative rather than positive in character.
This finding suggests the hypothesis that the 1928-30 splits in bank stock may be
usefully interpreted as initial public offerings (IPOs) of closely held firms.  Although an
IPO might be motivated simply by large-block shareholders’ desire to diversify an
inefficient exposure to a concentrated set of risks, insider concern about this exposure is
bound to be stronger when they possess adverse private information.  A corporation’s
stock is typically found to perform poorly after an IPO (Ritter, 1991) or secondary
offering (Lee, 1997).  However, for double-liability banks, Winton’s model adds a second
reinforcing explanation for the stock price decline.  After a split, the value of stockholder
monitoring services to other stakeholders (which is imbedded in bank stock price) would
fall for two reasons.  First, Winton shows that, when large-block shareholders reduce their
position, the probability that managers are effectively monitored and the quality of
managerial performance would both decline.  Second, as owners become more numerous
and less wealthy on average, the cost of monitoring their wealth and trading activity rises
and creditors encounter a fall in the expected value of the aggregate assets being posted as
a bond.
Table V compares the frequency in 1926 and 1930 of the par values chosen by a
panel of banks in different size-charter classes.  The panel includes all banks in “major”16
cities (listed in our Appendix) for which the Bank and Quotation Record reported a par
value throughout the period 1926-1933.  The average par value continued to decline in
each category during 1930-33, but post-1930 effects on relative frequencies are negligible.
In 1926, three points stand out.  First, a number of national banks enjoyed an
exemption from the $100 minimum value.  Exemptions prove much more frequent for
small banks than for large ones.  It is reasonable to presume that exemptions could be
negotiated for state banks that were seeking to convert to a national charter and perhaps
also for banks that were specifically organized to serve a small market.  Second, within
size classes, national banks have a smaller mean par value than state banks do.  The
difference turns on the different relative frequencies of $50 and $100 observations.  Third,
the tails of the relative-frequency distributions for large banks with different charters differ
much more than those for small ones.  All three points support the hypothesis that the
$100 minimum was a more burdensome restraint for large national banks in 1926 than it
was for smaller ones.
Between yearend 1926 and 1930, the frequency of very low par values increased
for all classes of banks.  This lowered the mean par value and raised the standard deviation
observed for each category.  Mann-Whitney and Kolmogov-Smirnov tests show that the
1926 and 1930 distributions differ significantly.  The greater frequency of the $50 value
for state banks suggests that a $50 minimum remained a charter requirement in several
states.  In both charter classes, a higher percentage of large banks moves away from the
$100 par value than small banks. Within size categories, more national banks than state-
chartered banks moved off the $100 par value.
Data on the number of shares (NSHARES) and number of individual shareholders
(NINDIV) were collected from Moody’s Banking and Finance Manuals bank by bank and
year by year.  Table VI reports regression estimates of a triangular model of the yearend
levels of NSHARES and NINDIV.  These equations introduce the control variable
(SHARE PRICE)it which equals the yearend market price of a single share on bank i.
Table IV fits the following two equations to an irregularly reporting panel of the 1933





S.        (4)
Panel data are incomplete because the number of shareholders is not reported by each
bank in every year.  The usable sample averages about 32 banks per year.
The regression estimates show that increases in stockholder distribution are driven
chiefly by the size of the bank’s surplus and par capital and (reflecting the influence of
stock splits) by the number of outstanding shares.  The number of shares and the number
of stockholders each increase with a bank’s par capital (PAR) and fall with the surplus
position (SUR).
The significance of the difference in the PAR and SUR coefficients may be clarified
by a thought experiment.  When a bank’s SUR grows while its PAR does not, it is building
capital through retained earnings and may have little need to raise outside capital.  When a
bank’s PAR grows, it has decided to build capital by issuing additional shares of stock.
Coefficient differences imply that, whenever PAR and the double-liability bond grow while
holding the value of book-value equity fixed, large-block shareholders would prefer to
enlist new shareholders.  The regressions estimate that the direct and indirect increase in
shareholders attributable to a $1 million reallocation of capital from surplus to the par
account would exceed 900.
A complementary way to investigate the interaction of par, size, and regulatory
competition in broadening stockholder distribution is to contrast the behavior of splitting
banks with another sample of banks matched in size and charter status.  Although we
could not find good size matches for most of the largest members of each charter class,
the largest state banks split their stock at least as frequently as national banks did.
Perhaps our most persuasive evidence is found in Chart 4.  This chart plots SUR
estimates of the 1933 event-week responses for each large bank displayed in Table I
against the observed 1927-33 change in the bank’s stockholder distribution.  The positive
correlation between the event-week responses and the observed broadening in stockholder
ownership is striking.  The scatter diagram firmly supports our contracting-theory18
explanation for the softening of large-bank opposition to the enactment of federal deposit
insurance that Calomiris and White found during the 1930s.
IV.  Summary and Policy Implications
Winton’s contracting theory (1993) explains how and why a broadening of
stockholder distribution at large banks could render double liability an unconvincing way
for stockholders to bond their monitoring services.  This paper clarifies that the pressure
of regulatory competition led Congress to grant national banks permission in 1927 to
broaden their stockholder distribution.  It also shows that the legislation that granted this
permission changed the return-generating process for bank stock and that stockholder
distribution at large banks expanded greatly between yearend 1926 and yearend 1930. We
show that, after a split, stockholder returns decline markedly.
Charts 1 and 2 show that the net monitoring premiums offered to large national-
bank stockholders were significantly positive from mid-1927 through mid-1929 when
most stock splits were unfolding. During the next year, the net monitoring premium was
negligible.  From mid-1930 through 1933, our estimate of the net premium at large
national and double-liability state banks was often significantly negative and usually more
negative than at the control group of limited-liability state banks.  Finally, we cite event-
study evidence that is consistent with the hypotheses that 1933 legislation that dictated the
phase-out of double-liability benefited stockholders at large banks more than stockholders
of small ones and that this legislation had a greater effect on large double-liability banks
than on large limited-liability institutions.
The strength of our case lies not in the persuasiveness of any particular piece of
evidence, but in how comfortably the various pieces fit together.  Like a mosaic, each
piece reinforces the effect of the others in supporting a contracting-theory interpretation of
the pattern of changes observed in double-liability monitoring premiums during 1926-
1933.
We believe that our research offers a useful policy suggestion for banking
supervisors in developing countries.  In these countries, private bank stock is usually
closely held and efforts to establish accounting transparency are often fiercely resisted.  In19
similar circumstances in U.S. history, insolvency-driven penalties for stockholders imposed
by contingent double liability succeeded in controlling depositor losses and even in
engendering voluntary bank liquidations at troubled institutions (Macey and Miller, 1992).
Instituting extended liability for closely held bank stock can strengthen supervisory
protections in developing countries and penalize in timely fashion ministerial efforts to
foist unwise credit-allocation schemes on a country’s private banking sector.20
Table I
1933 EVENT-STUDY EXPERIMENTS
(Rit Denotes the Weekly Percentage Price Appreciation on
stocks in NYC Banks in 1933)
Panel A:  Ordinary Least-Squares Regression Model
Rit = a + bRMt + cLNTDLNi￿DT + cLSTDLNi￿DT + cSNTDSNi￿DT + cSSTDSSi￿DT + uit
R.









standard error    11.13
N         2,39121
Panel B:  Seemingly Unrelated Regression Models for Price Appreciation at Subsamples
of Large and Small NYC Banks Recording A Stock Price in Each Trading Week
of 1933
1.  Large Banks




    • National Banks
        Chase NB 27.39 4.57
        N City B 21.20 7.44
        Commercial NB&TC 4.67 0.89
        N Exchange B&TC 7.51 1.23
        First NB 6.33 1.29
        Public NB 16.30 2.65
        Sterling NB&TC 32.84 5.40
Subsample Average: 16.61
    • State-Chartered Banks
        Bankers TC 10.47 2.00
        B of NY & TC 6.09 1.51
        Bronx County TC 25.92 2.79
        Banca Commerciale
          Italiano TC
-0.11 -0.19
        Brooklyn TC 18.86 2.56
        B di Sicilia TC 0.83 0.27
        Central Hanover TC 6.13 1.19
        Chemical B TC 7.64 1.53
        Continental B 10.89 1.82
        Corn Exchange B 13.08 2.25
        Empire TC 18.94 4.66
        Fifth Avenue B 0.87 0.45
        Fulton TC 8.20 4.17
        Guaranty TC 9.72 1.56
        Irving TC 16.70 3.12
        Kings County TC 0.13 0.15
        B of the Manhattan Co 41.81 7.14
        Manufacturers TC 25.77 3.07
        New York TC 16.21 2.7522
        Title Guarantee & TC 4.28 0.27
        US TC of NY 6.41 3.00
        Underwriters TC -13.77 -0.82
Subsample Average: 10.6923
Panel B:  continued
2.  Small Banks




    • National Banks
        Bensonhurst NB 0.12 0.06
        Bronx NB 0.22 0.06
        Flatbush NB 0.73 0.09
        Fort Greene NB 0.79 0.12
        Kingsboro NB 0.21 0.07
        Lafayette NB -1.67 -0.05
        Peoples NB - Brooklyn 0.36 0.11
        N Safety B&TC 6.96 0.87
        NB of Yorkville 0.68 0.19
Subsample Average:           0.93
    • State-Chartered Banks
        Citizens B - Brooklyn 0.13 0.19
        Clinton B -1.07 -0.15
        Clinton TC 8.41 1.39
        Pennsylvania Exchange B -0.24 -0.04
        Trade B of NY 0.51 0.09
        B of Yorktown -0.54 -0.11
Subsample Average: 1.20
Notes: B = Bank; N = National; TC = Trust Company.
Data Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle24
TABLE II:
1927 EVENT-STUDY EXPERIMENT
(Rit Denotes the Weekly Price Appreciation on


















Data Source:  Commercial and Financial Chronicle
Notes:  The following dummy variables partition the data across time:
D(-) = unity for t=1, ..., 12 and is zero otherwise;
D(0) = unity in the event week 13 and is zero otherwise;
D(+) = unity for t=14, ..., 51 and is zero otherwise.
DLN, DLS, DSN, and DSS partition the data by bank size and charter class.25
TABLE III:  STOCK SPLITS OCCURRING DURING 1927-33 IN THE WEEKLY
SAMPLE OF NEW YORK CITY BANK STOCKS
BANK
SPLIT
DATE PAR BID ASK PAR BID ASK
B of America NA 4/28/28 $100 1240 1250 $25 288 292
B of Manhattan Co 11/2/29 100 1070 1090 20 195 215
Bankers TC 4/6/29 100 1750 1825 10 175 180
Bronx County TC 8/17/29 100 532 550 20 100 106
Bryant Park B 8/24/29 100 480 -  
1 20 65 -  
2
Central Union TC 3/2/29 100 2575 -  
3 20 492 500
Chase NB 7/6/29 100 955 965 20 204 206
Chatham Phenix 9/21/29 100 775 790 20 165 169
Chelsea Exchange B 3/2/29 100 415 420 25 115 120
Chemical NB 5/11/29 100 1660 1680 10 112 115
Continental B 5/18/29 100 800 840 10 69 72
Corn Exchange B 5/25/29 100 1070 1080 20 208 212
Empire TC 9/7/29 100 600 610 50 122 127
Equitable TC 11/9/29 100 520 540 20 100 110
Fidelity TC 3/23/29 100 440 455 50 230 240
Fidelity TC 8/17/29 50 210 218 20 63 72
Hanover NB 1/12/29 100 1500 1550 50 785 815
International Germanic TC 8/17/29 100 203 211 50 104 108
Interstate TC 7/20/29 100 315 323 20 65 67
Amer Ex Irving TC 4/20/29 100 177 784 10 71 73
Manufacturers TC 6/2/28 100 1200 1220 20 297 302
N City B 1/19/29 100 1380 1390 20 278 281
New York TC 2/23/29 100 1150 1165 25 252 257
N Park B 5/25/29 100 1100 1115 20 158 163
Port Morris B 5/25/29 100 1250 1350 10 125 135
Public NB&TC 9/1/28 100 805 820 25 200 20526
Times Square TC 8/10/30 100 50 55 40 20 22
Title Guaranty TC 4/27/29 100 1000 1020 20 194 199
Data Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle.
Notes: * Institution is chartered as a national bank.
1 Bid quote only was listed.  Previous spread was $30.
2 Ditto.  The first post-split spread observed was $5.
3 Ditto.  The previous observed spread was $50.
TABLE IV:  BID-ASK QUOTES ON $20 AND $100 PAR SHARES OF EMPIRE
TRUST COMPANY DURING A 17-WEEK PERIOD OF SIMULTANEOUS
TRADING OF DUAL-PAR STOCKS
                 QUOTES ON               QUOTES ON
    $20 PAR SHARES $100 PAR SHARES
WEEK OF BID ASK BID ASK
9/7/29 $122 $127 $595 $605
9/14/29 121 125 590 600
9/21/29 122 126 595 605
9/28/29 123 127 600 610
10/5/29 118 123 580 600
10/12/29 118 123 590 598
10/19/29 119 123 585 595
10/26/29 115 119 540 560
11/2/29 90 95 450 470
11/9/29 75 85 320 420
11/16/29 70 80 360 390
11/23/29 80 90 400 420
11/30/29 80 85 405 415
12/7/29 82 86 417 426
12/14/29 81 85 407 415
12/21/29 80 85 385 395
12/28/29 78 83 380 390
Source:  Commercial and Financial Chronicle27
TABLE V:  DISTRIBUTION OF PAR VALUES AT A PANEL
OF 1445 SURVIVING LARGE AND SMALL NATIONAL
AND STATE BANKS IN 1926 AND 1930
Panel A:  Banks Whose Book Net Worth Exceeds $2 Million in 1926
            Large Banks   Large Banks











10 1 2 20 10
20 0 0 20 22
25 4 0 34 15
30 0 0 0 0
40 0 0 0 0
50 22 3 15 4
60 0 0 0 0
80 0 0 0 0
100 208 141 146 94
1,000     2     0     2     0
TOTALS 237 146 237 14628
Panel B:  Banks Whose Book Net Worth is Less than $2 Million in 1926
            Small Banks   Small Banks











10 6 1 22 11
20 0 1 27 18
25 15 5 42 18
30 2 1 2 1
40 0 2 0 1
50 88 17 75 15
60 2 1 2 1
80 1 0 1 0
100 592 328 535 291
1,000     0     0     2     0
TOTALS 706 356 706 356
Data Source:  Bank and Quotation Record
Note:  Sample consists of all banks in “major” cities that reported a par value throughout
1926-1933.29
TABLE VI:  REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF TRIANGULAR MODEL (3) AND
(4) OF YEAREND SHAREHOLDER DISTRIBUTION AT IRREGULARLY
REPORTING MEMBERS OF
THE 1933 NYC BANK SAMPLE, 1926-1933






intercept -1,026.47 1.35 48,195 0.46
(t–1926) 336.79 1.95 31,705 1.32
DN -354.71 -0.56 -10,315 -0.12
SHARE PRICE 1.47 1.64 -344 -2.78
SUR (in $ mil.) -896.23 8.82 -10,807 -5.02
PAR (in $ mil.) 293.65 -5.54 55,636 18.09
NSHARES .008 17.56 ...
R
2 .923 .786




Data Source:  Moody’s Bank and Finance Manuals and Dana Co.’s Commercial and
Financial ChronicleCHART 1: PLOT OF QUARTER-BY-QUARTER t-STATISTICS FOR E AT BANKS 



























































































































CHART 2: PLOT OF QUARTER-BY-QUARTER CROSS-SECTIONAL


























































































































CHART 3A:  UNADJUSTED (BETA = 0) CUMULATIVE PRICE APPRECIATION BEFORE AND AFTER STOCK SPLITS FOR
NYC SAMPLE33
CHART 3B: BETA-ADJUSTED CUMULATIVE PRICE APPRECIATION BEFORE AND AFTER STOCK SPLITS FOR NYC
SAMPLE34
CHART 3C: MARKET-ADJUSTED (BETA = 1) CUMULATIVE PRICE APPRECIATION BEFORE AND AFTER STOCK
SPLITS FOR NYC SAMPLE35
CHART 4: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUR ESTIMATES OF THE 1933 EVENT-WEEK RESPONSE AND THE 1927-1933
INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS AT LARGE NYC BANKSREFERENCES
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